The evolution of M&A : does it create value? by Palminha, Francisco José Pires






























Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the MSc in Finance, at 
the Universidade Católica Portuguesa, and for the MSc in Management, at ESCP 












 May 2018 
Supervisor: Alberta Di Giuli 
 
Abstract 
Scholars defend that target firms are the winners when it comes to the analysis of the short-
term gains of Mergers and Acquisitions and acquirers usually present negative or non-
significant abnormal returns around the event date. However, these conclusions are argued 
among the finance community with arguments such as the fact that the Event Study analysis 
not being a good analysis to understand the gains for the acquirers that these profit on the long 
term, and that the markets cannot reflect these potential synergies on the short term. We then 
do a general analysis of the occurrence of the M&A deals taking place between 2000-2017 in 
an attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the tendencies. We also run an event study 
analysis to obtain the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for targets and acquirers, with 
our conclusions being very similar to those found in previous analyses, however we went 
deeper to understand how these CARs diverge from industry to industry (obtained from the 
companies SIC codes) as well as from deals done between acquirers and targets from the 
same Industry or from different industries. Lastly we run some regressions to understand the 
average CARs for the -15/15 days before and after the announcement, excluding the 
companies’ specific effects, in this last analysis we obtained interesting results that showed 
that during the financial crisis the average for the targets is smaller when compared to the 
figures before and after the crisis; for the acquirers the average found was positive arguing in 
favor of the thesis that the acquirer firms are able to explore the crisis period to have positive 
CARs when acquiring potentially fragilized targets. 
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Resumo 
Os investigadores defendem que as empresas-alvo são as vencedoras no que toca à análise dos 
ganhos a curto prazo em casos de M&A, por outro lado os compradores apresentam retornos 
anormais negativos ou não significativos em intervalos fixos antes e depois do anúncio da 
transação. No entanto estas conclusões são debatidas no meio académico com argumentos 
como o facto de a análise de Event Studies sendo vista como uma forma não muito correcta 
para compreender os ganhos para os compradores, é defendido que estes lucram no longo 
prazo e que os mercados não têm a capacidade de refletir, no curto prazo, os efeitos positivos 
destas sinergias. Nós fazemos uma análise geral da ocorrência de negócios de M&A 
realizados entre 2000 e 2017 com o objectivo de concluir relativamente a algumas tendências. 
Para além disto, também corremos uma análise de Event Study para obter os Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) para empresas-alvo e compradores, encontrando conclusões muito 
semelhantes às encontradas na literatura, no entanto, querendo ir mais a fundo decidimos 
compreender como estes CARs variam de Industria para Industria(usando os SIC codes para 
identificar as indústrias) bem como de negócios feitos entre empresas da mesma indústria e 
negócios feitos entre empresas de indústrias de indústrias diferentes. Finalmente corremos 
algumas regressões  para compreender a médias dos CARs para os -15/15 dias antes e depois 
do anúncio da transação, excluindo os efeitos específicos das empresas, nesta última análise 
obtivemos resultados interessantes que mostraram que durante a crise a média para as 
empresas-alvo é menor quando comparada com os resultados para antes e depois da crise; 
para os compradores a média encontrada é positiva argumentando a favor da tese que as 
empresas compradoras foram capazes de explorar o período de crise para ter CARs positivos 
quando adquirindo empresas-alvo potencialmente fragilizadas. 
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 Research and analysis in the M&A area is something abundant in the existent 
literature, regarding performance (Papadakis and Thanos (2010); Zollo and Singh (2004); 
Beccali and Frantz (2009)), regarding the past waves of Mergers and Acquisitions (Brakman, 
Garretsen and Marrewijk (2008); Marrewijk(2005)), regarding integration of the targets ( 
Weber, Tarba and Bachar (2011); and numerous other aspects. This large amount of 
investigation is driven by the importance of these deals, its total value and number of 
occurrences1. However even with the vast literature, opinions diverge on the true value 
creation of these transactions, this because each individual case has its own history and each 
acquirer can have its own objectives to acquire a particular target, however, a single 
intersection in all deals is the attempt to create synergies. In the past, the occurrence of this 
types of transactions came in clusters, basically, there are two easily identifiable types of 
periods: one of significant M&A activity and one of M&A slumber (Sudarsanam (2003); 
Lipton (2006))2. Regarding industries, generally a first acquisition starts a wave that will lead 
to the consolidation of an industry (Berg and Smit (2007)); scholars have been trying to 
explain why these happen, with two different main justifications: (1) the neoclassical theory, 
which defends that mergers are reactions to industry shocks [antirust policy, deregulation 
(Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)), social, politics, economics 
(Sudarsanam (2003), basically the size a company should have within an industry changes 
and therefore it is beneficial to restructure; (2) the behavioral theory is related with the 
valuation in the stock market, defending that this is what drives M&A waves (Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004), basically periods of Merger activity have a correlation with high 
market valuation. 
 Despite the vast literature mentioned above, there is no significant analysis done 
regarding the evolution of M&A activities in different industries, as well as a comparison 
between these occurrences throughout time. 
 Given the written above some aspects that should be explored arise: Can we see any 
relevant trends in the M&A market in the 2000-2017 period? Do sectors present different 
trends regarding M&As? Was the M&A market affected by the 2007-2008 financial crisis? 
																																																								
1
 50.600 deals announced in the year of 2017 with a value of  €2.9 trillions. (Source: imaa institute). 
2
 Literature acknowledges the existence of five waves of M&As, from 1893-1904, from 1910-1929, 




Do Conglomerate and Non-Conglomerate M&As present the same trends in the 2000-2017 
period and particularly in the 2006-2008 financial crisis? Can we observe different abnormal 
returns (alpha) for the different sectors and for the conglomerate and non-conglomerate given 
the crisis period and the overall period? 
 
1.1 Research Question 
 
	 In an attempt to continue the analysis that was developed in previous research this 
thesis tries to provide a clearer understanding of the trends of the M&A market, particularly 
in the different industries analyzed. By using an event study analysis we also try to 
understand the different reactions of the market to the announcement of M&A deals. 
Hypothesis 1: Target firms during the Financial Crisis have lower CARs 
Hypothesis 2: Acquirers present very low negative CARs or even non-significant ones 
Hypothesis 3: Acquirers present positive CARs during the Crisis times 
 Previous literature focuses their analysis on the occurrence of M&A deals, however, 
none goes deep on this occurrences during the financial crisis, current literature also doesn’t 
agree on the results of these events, continuing to argue that long-term justifications might be 
present for the occurrence of M&A deals from the side of the acquirers. However, in 
Hypothesis 3 we raise the question of whether or not acquirers are able to profit from the 
crisis times to acquire firms in problems at “cheaper” prices. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Performance in M&A deals 
 
2.1.1 The Abnormal Returns analysis 
 
 When looking at performance measure there are three widely used measures: 
accounting-based measures, cumulative abnormal returns and managers’ subjective 
assessments. Papadakis and Thanos (2010) found accounting-based measures to be positively 
correlated to managers’ subjective assessments, however, the cumulative abnormal returns 
analysis doesn’t present any correlation to the other two methods, this lack of correlation can 




(2010)3 continuing the work of Schoenberg (2006), also found no correlation between the 
subjective assessments of managers and the other objective measures, moreover they added 
the cumulative abnormal returns analysis4, which was done accordingly to the adjusted-
market model and the market-adjusted model (Sudarsanam (2003)), in this context abnormal 
returns are computed as5 
!"!" = !!" − (!! + !!!!") 
with !"!" being the abnormal share price return of the acquiring firm i on day t, !!" being the 
observed share price return of acquiring firm i on day t, !! being the market model constant 
for acquiring firm i, !! being the beta of acquiring firm i and !!" being the return on the 
market portfolio on day t (Papadakis and Thanos (2010)). By using this method it was found 
that in 52% of all acquisitions studied, the announcement of the acquisition presented 
negative abnormal returns for the acquiring firms, however this results are not backed by 
other studies, namely: 1)Maquieira, Megginson and Nail (1998)6 , who found that the 
announcement of the acquisition presented positive abnormal returns for 61,8% of the 
acquiring firms. 
 
2.1.2 Event Studies 
 
 Generally, scholars defend that short-term event studies 7  are the best way to 
understand whether or not M&A deals create value for shareholders (Hackbarth and Morellec 
(2008); Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)), in these event studies are analyzed abnormal 
returns around the date of the announcement of the deal. In Mackinlay (1997) it is thoroughly 
explored the interest of studying the impact of a general event on the value of a specific firm, 
basically the effects of the event will have an immediate effect on stock prices and throughout 
the literature stock prices are used for understanding the performance of M&A deals since 
they are the only “direct measure of stockholder value” and also because it is a kind of data 
																																																								
3
 Data consists of acquisitions made by Greek listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange, during 
the period of 1997-2003 
 
5
 Some scholars (Haleblian and Finklestein (1999)) present a preferable method to calculate the 
Abnormal   (ARs), calculating as !"!" = !!" − !!" 
6
 Data consists of 55 acquisitions realized in the United States of America with a event window of -
60/60 days 
7
 Probably the first ever-published event study was done by James Dolley (1933), where he analyses 




which is easily accessible (Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986); Campa and Hernando (2004) 
(Check Annex 1). 
 The procedure for an event study (Mackinlay (1997)) is described as not having a 
unique structure but a general flow of analysis, however, if we wanted to define a step by step 
methodology to run an event study it would be: “Selection of the event and identification of 
the specific event dates”; “Definition of the event window”: this is generally larger than the 
period of interest, allowing for an analysis of the time before and after the specific event; 
“Definition of the estimation window”; “Selection of the sample of firms to be analyzed”; 
“Calculation of the normal returns
8
”; “Calculation of the abnormal returns as”:   
!"!" = !!" − !(!!"|!!) 
where, for firm i and event date b, AR!" are the abnormal returns, R!" are the actual returns, 
E(R!"|X!) are the normal returns for time period b and !! is the conditioning information for 
the normal return; “Calculation of the cumulative abnormal returns”; “Testing for the 
significance of the abnormal returns”. It is also of extreme importance to refer the Market 
model9 that compares the return of a firm to that of the market portfolio and is presented a 
!!" = !! + !!!!" + !!" 
! !!" = 0         !"#(!!") = !!!
!  
where !!" and !!" are the returns at time t for security i and the market portfolio (m), !!" is 
the errors term or as Mackinlay (1997) describes it, the “mean disturbance term”. The usage 
of such a model in very common is event studies’ analysis, since the model removes the part 
of the overall return that is related to variation in the market’s return, the variance of the 
abnormal returns is therefore reduced, this can lead to a better detection of the effects of a 
certain event. 
 Also using the analysis of Mackinlay (1997), an important aspect of an event study is 
the choice of the timeline, we can simply define the event date at ! = 0, then, the event 
window will be ]T1;T2], the estimation window will be ]T0;T1] 10 , with lengths of, 




 We understand normal returns as being the expected returns without conditioning on the event taking 
place 
9
 The model assumes a joint normality/multivariate normal distribution of asset returns. Basically, a 
constant and linear relation between the assets’ returns and the Market return. 
10
 At (Mackinlay (1997)) we see the event window defined as being between ! = !1 + 1 and ! = !2 




2.1.3 Analysis of Targets and Acquirers:  what is a Successful deal? 
 
 M&A deals are made between two parties, the acquirer and the target; literature done 
in this area has found that the effects for bidders and for targets are different (Ma, Pagán and 
Chu (2009).  In Bruner (2004)11 some light is shunned on who really benefits from an M&A 
deal, the analysis suggests that target’s shareholders earn positive market returns and that 
bidders, earn zero adjusted returns, however, the total result is a positive combined adjusted 
return. These conclusions indicate that executives from acquirer firms should look at M&A 
deals as a potential destroyer of value, Grubb and Lamb (2000) even refer that only 20% of all 
mergers really succeed, whilst most of them only erode shareholder value failing to achieve 
any real financial return. Even though these findings may show M&A as being a very risky 
and maybe not worthwhile transaction, there is still a big confusion regarding what it truly 
means for a deal to “pay”. In a response to this Bruner (2004) defined three possible 
outcomes: Value conserved, when the investment’s return equals the required return12, the 
investment has an NPV=0, therefore this is not a failure and the investor can be pleased with 
the deal; Value created, when the investment’s return exceeds the required investment, the 
investment has an NPV>0, given the market situation it is hard to sustainably deliver this kind 
of performance, in this case there is a positive abnormal return; Value destroyed, when the 
investment’s return is less that the required return, the investment has an NPV<0, the investor 
could have obtained a better performance by investing in another option with the same risk, 
therefore, the investor should not be pleased with the deal. With these clearly defined 
outcomes, it became possible to more easily define if a deal was successful, being it when it 
didn’t destroy any value. Nevertheless, it is arguable that by using just this economic factor to 
define the result of a deal, we are ignoring numerous other more qualitative variables. Against 
this argument is the fact that manager’s motives might not be the best ones or even that the 
managers themselves are not the best ones, Bruner (2004) gives the example of vague 
strategic benefits, the creation of special capabilities, the achievement of competitive scale, or 
the case of two organizations or CEOs being especially friendly, referring that there is no 
clear way to look at these aspects and concluding whether they created value other than 
looking at the economic outcome of the deal. 
																																																								
11
 Data consists of 130 studies from 1971 to 2001. 
12
 This required rate of return refers to rate the investor could have received on other investment 




 Referring yet again to the different returns for targets and bidders, earlier literature 
strengthened the position that targets tend to be the “winners” of these transactions by 
agreeing unanimously that acquisitions create value for targets.  Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
show abnormal returns of 20-30%13 at the time of announcement; Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
show a median abnormal return of 18.4% with an analysis period of -1/+1 days around 
announcement date. 
 Bidder’s/Acquirer’s returns have also been analyzed by numerous scholars however 
findings are not so conclusive as those of target firms, different scholars found returns to be 
positive, negative and even insignificant. Namely, Morck, Shleifer, Vishny (1990) and 
Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) found bidders to have systematic negative announcement 
period returns, with the first analyzing 326 acquisitions of U.S. firms ranging from 1975 to 
1987 and the second, 1086 takeovers from 1985 to 2002, Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) 
found a -0,52% 3 day cumulative abnormal return; Mulherin and Boone (2000) 14 and Tichy 
(2001) studies allowed them to conclude that bidders experience an insignificant mean 
change, whilst, Jensen and Ruback (1983)15, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988)16 and Jarrel, 
Brickley and Netter (1988)17 all found returns for bidders to be positive. Despite all this 
divergence in opinion, there is a consistency in the majority of the analysis, referring to the 
positive combined abnormal returns (Servaes (1991), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stultz (2005)) 
 These results make it very hard for any person trying to compare any results obtained 
with the consensus of the literature, given that there is no consensus in the literature. Some 
scholars even defend that when looking at M&A deals, more specifically at the value creation 
for bidders, a long-term view should be employed, going against the view present above in 
Bruner (2004). The reasoning is that if the deal is a long-term strategy the full value is not 
comprehended by market reactions in a small time period around the announcement date but 
using accounting-based measures makes it easier for the results to be manipulated as defended 





 Results obtained from 13 empirical studies from 1956 to 1981. 
14
 A negative return of -0,37%. 
15
 The results obtained were that there was a 4% gain in tender offers and no gain in mergers. 
16
 The results obtained were that there was less than a 1% gain. 
17





2.2 Waves of Mergers 
 
 When scholars discuss M&A deals, there are 5 periods that are considered to be the 
ones where the number of deals was larger, this analysis is developed in Sudarsanam (2003) 
therefore the analysis is only defined until the publishing of the book, which is 2003. In the 
past century, according to the literature M&A deals come in waves, with very distinguishable 
periods of numerous deals, as well as periods of relative deal inactivity. Sudarsanam (2003) 
defines the following periods: “1893-1904; 1910-1929; 1955-1975; 1984-1989; 1993-2000”. 
 Going deeper in each of the merger it is understandable that each one has its own 
characteristics and then it is important to analyze each one: 
 1893-1904: This period can be described as a period of horizontal integration within 
the manufacturing industry which led to the Merger of firms in the Oil, steel, and other 
commodity sectors, creating the first very big firms operating in these fields. The dimension of 
this wave of M&A amounted to more than 15% of the Assets in the United States of America. 
This period of creation of giant firms was supported by the fact that there was no strong force 
limiting the creation of monopolies, even with the creation of the Sherman Antitrust Act
18
 in 
1890, whose purpose and measures were not yet visible. The end of this wave came due to 
multiple factors, namely, the stronger implementation of the Anti Trust laws defined in the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, because of the stock market crash of 1905 and also because of the 
political environment that was being set worldwide in preparation for the First World War.  
 1910-1929: This period of intense deal-making was a period of vertical integration 
that saw most of its activity in sectors such as food, iron and paper. During this period 
companies adapted to the antitrust laws that were in place, therefore, the result is not the 
creation of monopolies but the creation of some very big firms in each sector that coexisted 
among them; companies that didn’t merge with the monopolistic reacted by doing friendly 
deals in order to take advantage of economies of scale. The dimension of this wave of deals 
was around 10% of the Assets in the U.S.A. The end of this wave came because of the 1929’s 
crash, opening the doors to the Great Depression
19
, which lasted until 1939. 
																																																								
18
 The Sherman Antitrust Act was a federal statute passed by the United States’ Congress in 1890 with 
the objective of prohibiting any contract or partnership that reduced economic competition. 
19
  The Great Depression was a worldwide crisis that started in the U.S.A. and is considered to be the 
worst and most widespread depression in the 20
th
 century. It started from a crash in the stock market, 
known as Black Tuesday (29
th




 1955-1975: This period started only after the Great Depression and the Second World 
War were finished, basically, only when favorable conditions were in place. This period was 
the first wave where deals were very focused in “diversification”, therefore, whereas in the 
first merger monopolies were created, here, we see the formation of conglomerates, this 
allowed firms to diversify from industry-specific risks but also made them enter in businesses 
that they didn’t, sometimes, understand
20
. Accordingly to Sudarsanam (2003) in this wave, 
among all Fortune 500 companies, the percentage of firms involved in businesses that were 
not their main one, raised from 9% to 21%. This wave came to an end because of the oil crisis 
that culminated in 1981. 
 1984-1989: This merger can be defined as a period of divestment from the firms that 
had created big conglomerates in the last wave; the market was in a depressed state so other 
firms were trying to buy, at a low price, the divisions that the conglomerates were trying to 
sell. Sudarsanam (2003) defends that the buying firms were trying to increase their economic 
power whereas the selling firms were looking to sell their unprofitable businesses, or just the 
ones they didn’t understand. In this period the usage of Leveraged Buyouts 
21
(LBOs) arose. 
These conglomerate M&A deals have been previously studies and scholars have vastly 
concluded about it, namely, Berger and Ofek (1995) found a positive correlation between the 
similarity of the businesses and the returns of the transaction, the average loss from 
diversification amounted to 13-15%
22
. The end of this wave came yet again from a slowing of 
the stock market and consequent market crash. 
 1993-2000: This period was a period of serious globalization accordingly to Crafts 
(2004), this gave a strong support to cross-border mergers, companies still wanted to grow 
but the creation of conglomerates, in numerous cases ended up as failed attempts, therefore, 
entering new markets was a way for companies to grow. Sudarsanam (2003) argues that what 
opened the door to this wave was a technologic development paired with an attempt of 
companies to refocus on their resources and capabilities and using them to gain a competitive 
																																																								
20
 Some literature defends that companies should not diversify, that entering into industries it doesnt 
understand, the firm will become more fragile. This reasoning defends that diversification should be 
left in the end of investors, if they want to diversify they can invest in two or more companies, instead 
of in a diversified company. 
21
 A leverage buyout is an acquisition of a firm using a high amount of debt to do it. A particular 
aspect of this operation is that the assets of the target firm and bidder are usually used as collateral to 
the loan. 
22




advantage. What originated the end of this wave was the crash caused by the burst of the 
Internet bubble.  
 It is important to refer that the amount of deals starts to slow down before completely 
crashing, generally with the crash of the economy. On the other hand, when the number of 
M&A deals increases, it is accompanied with economic growth and a bullish market. 
 The literature associated with M&A waves also spans far, with numerous models 
having been developed and conclusions put forward, these models are very related with 
changes in the company’s environment, such as product demand or industry’s growth, also, 
agency problems, as well as a very positive financial environment, Lambrecht (2004) 
concluded that firms have a tendency to merge in periods of economic expansion, the scholars 
ended up relaxing the assumption that firms are price takers, with this they found out that 
market power strengthens the firms’ incentive to merge and speeds up merger activity. In 
Lambrecht (2004) it is also shown that mergers motivated by economies of scale are 
positively correlated to product market demand. With this, the authors concluded that 
empirical evidence is consistent with the fact that cyclical product markets will generate a 
pattern of merger waves. Regarding Industry demand and not only product demand, 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) conclude that when demand in an industry increases, M&A 
deals tend to happen because more efficient providers tend to buy the assets of not so efficient 
firms, the probability of M&A deals taking place is higher when the selling firm is less 
productive and the industry experiences a positive demand shock.  Basically what 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) conclude is that the “market for corporate assets eases the 
process of shifting of assets from firms with a lower ability to exploit them to firms with a 
higher ability to do it”.  
 Moreover, Andrade and Stafford (2004) explain the increases of M&A activity with 
industry and firm-specific shocks, with this reasoning, by looking at general accounting or 
financial factors we may not be able to predict a merge or even understand one when it 










3 Data and Methodology 
 
 The Databases used to build this research were Thompson One Banker and 
Datastream. Two groups of data samples were used, one for an initial and more general 
analysis and another one for a more detailed qualitative analysis as well as to do the event 
study analysis present in this research; the data was initially filtered according to some criteria 
very similar to those present in Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
 The first sample consists of (1) all acquisitions occurred between 2000 and 
2017(inclusive), the dates used for this analysis were the effective dates of the merger. By 
using Thompson One Banker, the data was filtered accordingly to some criteria: (2) the 
bidders selected were from 14 different countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K and the 
U.S.A; (3) the deal attitude could be friendly or hostile; (4) both the acquirer and the target 
have to be public firms; (5) the percentage of shares owned after the transaction could range 
from 5% to 100%. Afterwards, a general analysis was done to try to understand any kind of 
tendencies taking place from 2000 to 2017 that would support or go against the conclusions 
found. The finalized dataset had 7818 transactions with 4209 different acquiring companies 
and 7019 different target companies, in this case the dataset was not very filtered since the 
objective was simply to have a general idea of the trends of the M&A market, the evolution of 
the number of deals per year and also how were the deals distributed in terms of industries, an 
analysis still lacking in the current literature.  
 For the second sample (1) two ranges of dates were used: from 2016 to 
2017(inclusive) and from 2006 to 2009(inclusive), the dates used for this analysis were the 
announcement dates of the merger; (2) the bidders selected were from the same 14 different 
countries present above; (3) the deal attitude could be friendly or hostile; (4) both the acquirer 
and the target have to be public firms; (5) the percentage ownership after the transaction could 
range between 50% and 99%.  
 For both datasets we removed the acquisitions that didn’t have the “primary SIC code” 
for either the acquirer or the target; this is justified by the need to understand the industry of 
the firms, which are the following: 






1800-1999: Not Used 
2000-3999: Manufacturing 
4000-4999: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 
5000-5199: Wholesale trade 
5200-5999: Retail Trade 
6000-6799: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
7000-8999: Services 
9100-9729: Public Administration 
9900-9999: Not Used 
 From One Banker we also extracted the Datastream codes for each company, both 
acquirers and target firms, this data was extracted with the purpose of doing the event study 
analysis, the years of 2007 and 2008 are the crisis years and the others, namely 2006, 2009, 
2016 and 2017 are the non crisis years and the ones we will use to compare with the results 
obtained in 2007 and 2008. Any deal whose companies don’t present a Datastream code is 
automatically deleted from the sample; we ended up with 243 deals for the timeline 2006-
2009 and 44 deals for the timeline 2016-2017. The following analysis consisted in using the 
MSCI as the Market Return in order to compute the abnormal returns and subsequently the 
cumulative abnormal returns, after building the dataset used to compute the CARs a 
calculation of the average of the CARs as well as its standard errors had to be computed to get 
the t-statistic and understand if the abnormal returns are significantly different from 0 
 To sum up, we used the Thompson One banker to extract the basis of our dataset and 
followed to use Datastream to extract both the returns of the Acquiring firms and target firms.  
 In the general analysis, with the purpose of understanding the evolution of the deals in 
the different industries multiple tables were built: to understand the country distribution of 
deals and another to understand yearly distribution; this reasoning was done for targets and 
for acquirers. 
 In the event study analysis, different timelines were tested in order to understand the 
significance of the returns, basically if the abnormal returns that we discovered are 
significantly different from zero.  
 The timeline was chosen to provide us with results that took place during the financial 
crisis (2007-2008) and others that took place before (2006) and after (2009; 2016-2017) the 
financial crisis. This allowed us to take our entire conclusions based solely on our database 




 As our objective was also to understand if there was any change in the average CARs 
during the crisis and non crisis times for the acquirers we decided to do a regression analysis 
to understand the average CARs our sample ranging between 2006-2009, we then build a 
regression using as the sole variable the CARs for the time scope -15/15 for all acquirers and 
targets, we controlled for company specific effects by using a company indicator and then 
regressing using the Stata Software (Check Annexes 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26: Tables A)  
with this we are able to obtain the average CARs for all firms for the entire 31 days period 
instead of focusing on the cumulative abnormal return on a single day. The regression 
imputed in Stata was the following: 
!"#$ !"#2,!"#$%"(!"#1) 
 
with var 2 being the CARs for all companies in the time scope -15/15 and var1 the company 
identifier. 
 
4 The Evolution of the M&A activity 
 
 In this dissertation, we tried to follow the reasoning of the literature and therefore 
discover the trends in the M&A market. As already explained both in this work and in 
Sudarsanam (2003): the market experiences an occurrence of merger waves intercalated with 
periods of significant decrease of deals. By looking at our results from analyzing the first 
Dataset23 we can understand that in the entire period 2000 was the year with the highest 
amount of deals, 1014, as well as the year with the highest amount of value of transactions, 
$1 724 667,52 (Check Annex 4: Table A and Annex 7: Table A). This value in 2000 is 
explained by a concentration of the markets by use of M&A deals; Du Boff and Herman 
(2001) concluded that in 1999 the worldwide value of these deals reached approx. 
$3,4trillion, which is equivalent to 34% of the value of industrialized assets24 in the U.S.A for 
the same year; however scholars predicted that in this period the merger wave was reaching 
its end, which ended up being the truth, in our analysis, in the next 3 years the number of 
deals fell 70,9% 25 and the total value of transactions fell 124%(Check Annex 4: Table A, 
Annex 7: Table A)26; for the value separated in U.S.A and Europe as well as in the different 
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 The dataset from 2000 to 2017 with 7818 deals. 
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 Equivalent to PP&E: product, plants and equipment 
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 2001: -27,2%; 2002: -32,8%; 2003: -10,9% 
26




industries check Annex 8: Table A. Therefore we can conclude that the high relative values for 
2000 are just the continuation of the wave of deals; this wave ended with the burst of the  
“dot-com bubble” as well as with the terrorist attacks that took place in 2001 in the U.S.A, 
basically, for the dot-com crash, only one out of 2 “internet companies” survived, however 
even the survivors were very weakened by the burst, Amazon, a success story, saw its share 
price go down from $100 during the bubble to $7 after the burst.  
 As already mentioned, the merger waves that took place in the past had different 
characteristics, ones where the deals were mostly conglomerate deals, others where the deals 
were of firms in the same industry, given this we also did an analysis of the evolution of the 
conglomerate and non conglomerate deals from 2000 to 2017, the evolution as seen in Annex 
14 Figure A is very similar to that of the total deals, basically, it moves in the same direction 
in almost every period, moreover the number of non-conglomerate deals dominates the 
conglomerate ones in most cases, in particular, in the industries with the most amount of 
deals: “Manufacturing” and “Finance Insurance and Real Estate”. 
 We were also able to discover three peaks in M&A deals that the literature defines as 
the peaks of three merger waves (Liner (2016)), these happened around the years of 2000, 
2007 and 2015.  We can observe this by looking at the Annexes 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 Figures A. 
When we divide the analysis into U.S.A and Europe for the Acquirers or U.S.A and “Rest of 
the World” for the targets the peak taking place in 2015 is much more observable in the 
U.S.A. This increase in the numbers are pushed by the “Mining”(14% of the total change of 
42 deals), “Manufacturing”(67% of the total change of 42 deals), “Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service”(12% of the total change of 42 deals) 
and “Finance Insurance and Real Estate”(19% of the total change of 42 deals)27. In an overall 
analysis, the total amount of acquirers and targets in the U.S.A is higher than the sum of all 
the other countries in the analysis (U.S.A acquirers=4472; Europe acquirers = 3346; U.S.A 
targets=4009; Europe acquirers = 3745) this shows that the M&A market in the U.S.A is 
much more active than that those of other countries.  
 As mentioned “Manufacturing” and “Finance Insurance and Real Estate” were the two 
industries with the highest number of firms acquiring and being acquired (Check Annex 11: 
Table A, Annex 12: Table A and Annex 12: Table A and B), this reality will continue for the 
rest of the years.  
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 The justification behind the manufacturing industry having a very high number of 
deals (acquirers of this sector engaging in transactions) rests in numerous facts, namely: The 
automation process that has been taking place in the past years, companies, in order to 
continue to be competitive, they have to promptly adapt to the changes in the market and to 
become more efficient in an ever-changing industry. Companies, therefore, acquire other 
companies that develop technologies that can be used to improve their own operations, given 
the fact that changes happen fast, it may be more costly in terms of competitive advantage and 
R&D to try to develop the technologies by themselves; this fact is particularly true for this 
industry. An example of this is the automotive and aerospace industries, which are included in 
the manufacturing industry, with the SIC codes 371 and 372; these areas are always in the 
forefront of innovation, Aerospace particularly is being driven by an increasing demand for 
aircrafts, PWC projected in 2013 that the overall demand for aircrafts would be around $4800 
billion.  
 In this industry, we can understand a negative tendency from 2000 onwards with two 
peaks, in 2005 (161 acquirers, 32% change from previous year) and 2007 (173 acquirers, 16% 
change from previous years), after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the number of deals fell 
intensely28. When we look at the number of targets in the deals, the outlook is more or less the 
same as the analysis made for the acquirers, the changes are just more pronounced: it had the 
same peaks in 2005(154 deals 43% change from previous year) and 2007(188 deals, 29% 
from previous year), the crisis also affected the number of targets29. The decrease that took 
place from 2007 to 2009 (Check Annex 11: Table A, Annex 12: Table A) is a reaction of the 
market to the financial crisis, an important portion of this industry is the automobile industry, 
which suffered the 2008-2010 “automotive industry crisis”, this crisis affected the European, 
American and Asian markets and was caused by an increase in fuel prices, this lead to a slow 
down in the purchases of cars with high consumption levels which by the time were the focus 
of numerous producers, namely the SUV’s; another supporting factor was the boom in 
commodity prices, particularly the raw materials needed for the manufacturing process, some 
scholars explain this increase in prices as investors escaping from more risky investments into 
the commodity markets (Conway(2008)). All the mentioned above led companies to refocus 
on their essential operations, leading to a decrease in the number of acquisitions taking place.  
 In the Financial Industry, we can also observe a similar trend to that of the 
manufacturing industry, with peaks in 2000(278 acquirers), 2007(210 deals, 26% change 
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from previous year) and 2015(105 acquirers, 8% change from previous year); after the 
financial crisis, the number of deals decreased30, this goes somewhat against the idea that the 
amount of deals increased derived of banks considered to be healthy, acquiring poorly 
performing banks to try to reduce the systematic risk (Maslak, Senel (2018)), however we 
observed this tendency during the year of 2007, the number of deals in the Financial industry 
increased 26% with the total amount of deals increasing 19,5% to 607(the number of 
acquirers from Europe and the U.S.A both increased, 20,2% to 291 and 18,8% to 316, 
respectively; this similarity hadn’t happened in the previous years where the U.S.A saw the 
number of acquirers decrease31 whereas the numbers in Europe increased substantially32. We 
also did an analysis of this industry between 2005-2011 (Check Annex 15: Table A), the 
results found in this analysis allow us to understand that, basically, from 2005 to 2012, 
European acquirers reacted with 1 year of delay comparatively to was done in the United 
States, for example, whilst the United States reached a peak in 2007, in Europe, this only 
happened in 2008; this effect can be understood from the fact that the crisis spread from the 
United states to Europe, with the Real Estate crisis being a big source of the problems (note 
that “Real Estate” is included in this industry: SIC code 65). 
  
5 Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Targets and Acquirers 
 
 As already mentioned, accordingly to the literature, we are expecting positive CARs 
for the target firms and negative or insignificant for the acquirers, however we raised the 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) that acquirers during crisis time might have positive CARs due to 
the fact that targets firms are fragilized and may be bought at cheaper prices. The justification 
behind this reasoning is that target firms’ investors, generally are the target of very generous 
offers to have their shares acquired, therefore, their shares will tend for the price the market 
tends will end up being paid by the shares, in most cases this change in price happens with a 
positive sign. The same reasoning doesn’t apply to the acquirers, in this case, the result for the 
firms is not so straightforward, leading us to think that there are numerous other factors that 
are not understood by a simple event study analysis; we come back again to the possibility of 
long-term gains. In the acquirers’ case, the results are in most cases negative. 
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The differences are: 32%, -15%, -21%, -32%, respectively. (3) Regarding the relationship 
with the time scope and the size of the CAR’s, we don’t have a clear tendency, from the 15-
days analysis to the 7-days analysis; the relation is the same as in the other samples, basically 
the CAR’s increase with the decrease of the time scope, however in the time scope of -5/5 and 
-5/0 this doesn’t apply. A possible justification is that there are, on average, abnormal returns, 
which are not so close to the event date, namely days -7, -6, 6 and 7, those contribute to a 
higher CAR. An interesting observation from comparing the crisis and non-crisis time scopes, 
in this sample is that, whilst, for the non-crisis period the average cumulative abnormal 
returns before the event are mostly negative and with very high absolute values, being 
compensated by the abnormal returns at the event date and after; during the crisis, the CARs 
before the announcement are mostly positive and even when negatives the absolute values are 
very small, we basically can observe a continuation of a trend whilst before and after the 
crisis, there is a clear shock at the event date (Check Annex 20: Figure A, B, C and D). 
 Referring to the acquirers? analysis, we also have a division of data between crisis and 
non-crisis, being the first the period of 2007-2008 and the latter, the period of 2006, 2009 and 
2016-2017. In our analysis of the CARs of these firms, our results presented much lower t-
stats, meaning that our abnormal returns may end up being insignificant, basically that the 
mean that we are testing to be different than zero is actually zero (Check Annex 17 and 19: 
Tables A, B, C and D). 
 For the sample with a timeline between 2016 and 2017, the sample mean of the CARs 
is negative in all time scopes but the -15/15, -15/0 and -7/0 ones, which is also the one with 
the lowest t-stat; in all cases the CARs are very small in absolute terms, which is consistent 
with what the literature defends. Again, the abnormal returns are “not significant” in most 
cases unless we use a very high p-value, we can try to explain this by looking at the way we 
are testing the “significance” of these abnormal returns; the t-stat can be driven to be very low 
when the sample mean of the CARs is very low compared to the Standard Error (which 
depends on the Standard Deviation), or when the standard Error is very high compared to the 
sample mean of the CARs; in our particular case we understand that the standard error is not 
big, being even very low when compared to the value for the target firms, however, the 








6 Regression Analysis 
 
 Looking at the regression found in Annexes 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 we can take 
some conclusions. Its important to understand that, in the way the regression was built (; 
var1=company identifier; var2= CARs for all companies in the time scope -15/15) the 
coefficient found in the regressions is the average of the cumulative abnormal returns 
controlled for the firms’ specific effects. Regarding the analysis of the targets, the findings 
support what we had already mentioned; basically the average is positive in the two periods 
tested, 2007-2008 (check Annex 22: Table A) and 2006&2009 (check Annex 23: Table A), as 
well as being significant with a very low p-value (check Annex 22: Table A; check Annex 23: 
Table A). Moreover, the averages during the crisis year were smaller when compared to the 
non-crisis years, this can be justified by investors being more conservative regarding their 
future prospects of the firms which caused these firms abnormal returns to be smaller. 
 This regression analysis was also done with the objective to understand the results 
previously found about the acquirers, looking at the results of the regressions we understand 
that for the crisis period the average of the CARs ended up being very small but nonetheless 
positive, this is consistent with the Hypothesis 3 raised regarding the fact that during the crisis 
acquirers may be able to have better results from acquisitions resulting from being able to 
profit from a not so healthy situation of the target firms. For the non-crisis period, the average 
is negative as we also expected and as the current scholars have been concluding. For the 
crisis time, the results are considered to be significant given the very low p-values (Check 

















 In this thesis, we take a look at the trends of the M&A market and at the Abnormal 
returns for acquirers and target firms. The current literature is non-consistent with regards to 
the gains for acquirers and targets originated from M&A deals; whilst it is consistent that 
target firms tend to obtain positive abnormal returns, for acquirers scholars argue about the 
quality of this analysis. Building on the previous literature we study this abnormal returns for 
the crisis period and for the non-crisis period, trying to find any difference. We compare the 
timeline 2006, 2009 and 2016-2017 with the period 2007-2008, finding some important 
differences both in the amount of the abnormal returns, its evolution in the time scope chosen 
and the differences between time scopes. We concluded that, as expected, the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns for the target firms are positive and significant (very high t-stats) and the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for acquirers are negative, with very low absolute values, 
however, they generally present very low t-stats, making us question their significance. Going 
further in this analysis we ran some regressions to find the averages of the -15/15 CARs 
whilst controlling for the companies’ specific effects. The major conclusion taken was the 
fact that the average for the acquirers during the crisis time was positive and with a very low 
p-value; supporting the possibility raised in this dissertation that during the crisis period 
acquirers might take advantage of the fragilized targets. 
Lastly, not satisfied with the previous analysis we decided to question someone that had 
experience in M&A in order to understand what guides acquirers to do M&As and if the 
understanding of the success must be done with a long-term look. We decided then to ask the 
former CEO of a Portuguese bank- “Caixa Económica Montepio Geral”, Mr. José Felix 
Morgado. The question asked was: “What is, in your opinion, the motives that lead acquiring 
firms to do M&A deals when researchers continue to argue that markets tend to penalize the 
share price (accordingly to the Event study analysis)?” The answer was: 
“Companies decide to buy others for gaining market quota taking advantage of scale 
economies and synergies (dilution of fixed costs or the increase of the bargaining power with 
suppliers and clients); to improve the management process of the target, leading to efficiency 
gains (in case the target has a bad management capability); also to promote a geographic 
expansion utilizing the knowledge of the business or to diversify its holdings. 
Normally acquirers are penalized because they don’t have a robust business case that 




communicate poorly to the market their intentions. Other cases are also the dilution of results 
in a first phase, which should be justified in the business case, the need for investment can 
decrease the Cash Flows and therefore decrease the capability to distribute dividends 
(causing a decrease in the Dividend Yield, an important factor for investors)”(Mr. José Felix 
Morgado- Former CEO of Caixa Económica Montepio Geral) . The opinion of Mr. Felix 
Morgado is therefore that if an acquirer does everything to signal to the market the objective 
of the M&A and the potential benefits the market will respond accordingly instead of 
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Annex 3: Number of Acquirers and Targets per country (General Analysis) 
 In the general analysis, as already mentioned in the Methodology chapter, we used 14 
acquiring countries as a filter for our collection of data, however we didn’t filter the data 
accordingly to the country of the target firms, given this we can have an understanding of the 
diversity of countries where the 14 acquiring regions are making acquisitions. 
 
(Continues in the next page) 
Country N % N %
United States 4472 57,20% 4009 51,28%
United Kingdom 928 11,87% 642 8,21%
France 561 7,18% 447 5,72%
Germany 454 5,81% 359 4,59%
Sweden 291 3,72% 225 2,88%
Switzerland 221 2,83% 114 1,46%
Italy 202 2,58% 149 1,91%
Spain 190 2,43% 115 1,47%
Norway 159 2,03% 173 2,21%
Belgium 103 1,32% 48 0,61%
Finland 82 1,05% 50 0,64%
Austria 75 0,96% 48 0,61%
Ireland-Rep 43 0,55% 22 0,28%






Russian Fed 45 0,58%
Brazil 38 0,49%
Japan 36 0,46%
South Africa 34 0,43%













Czech Republic 13 0,17%
Greece 13 0,17%





































Utd Arab Em 2 0,03%
Kazakhstan 2 0,03%
Bosnia 2 0,03%
Slovak Rep 2 0,03%
Iceland 2 0,03%
Serbia & Mont. 2 0,03%
British Virgin 2 0,03%
Reunion 1 0,01%
Cameroon 1 0,01%




Falkland Is 1 0,01%
Isle of Man 1 0,01%
Zimbabwe 1 0,01%
Bolivia 1 0,01%
Faroe Islands 1 0,01%
Georgia 1 0,01%
Neth Antilles 1 0,01%
Philippines 1 0,01%
Kenya 1 0,01%










































United States 5 253 30 1372 388 55 115 1499 755 4472
United Kingdom 4 149 20 204 65 11 50 251 174 928
France 1 21 12 160 61 6 29 160 111 561
Germany 0 1 5 141 52 1 3 196 55 454
Sweden 2 7 15 69 24 0 6 114 54 291
Switzerland 0 6 3 109 7 4 1 71 20 221
Italy 0 10 0 60 28 1 4 84 15 202
Spain 0 0 19 28 41 0 2 93 7 190
Norway 3 39 3 39 23 3 0 24 25 159
Belgium 1 2 0 33 2 1 2 52 10 103
Finland 0 0 0 50 12 0 1 7 12 82
Austria 0 4 1 29 2 0 0 28 11 75
Ireland-Rep 0 7 0 23 0 1 0 6 6 43
Portugal 0 0 1 7 6 0 3 19 1 37


























United States 6 168 28 1182 310 54 104 1312 845 0 4009
United Kingdom 4 51 24 144 60 14 37 132 176 0 642
France 1 10 10 118 30 14 19 110 132 3 447
Germany 1 0 11 117 38 3 6 90 93 0 359
Canada 1 142 4 90 17 4 6 16 61 0 341
Sweden 1 7 5 69 16 7 10 48 62 0 225
Norway 9 35 1 53 20 5 2 14 34 0 173
Australia 0 80 3 28 7 5 3 17 25 0 168
Italy 0 0 0 33 26 1 0 70 19 0 149
Spain 0 1 4 24 27 3 3 40 13 0 115
Switzerland 0 1 2 52 11 0 2 31 15 0 114
India 0 5 3 53 4 2 1 9 8 0 85
Netherlands 0 2 2 21 13 2 1 12 11 0 64
Poland 1 0 7 20 3 1 0 21 5 0 58
Finland 0 0 1 20 7 4 0 10 8 0 50
Austria 0 0 0 17 9 0 0 13 9 0 48
Belgium 1 1 3 15 4 0 0 15 9 0 48
Russian Fed 0 7 0 13 15 1 0 9 0 0 45
Portugal 0 0 4 11 6 0 2 16 2 0 41
Brazil 0 3 0 13 10 1 3 6 2 0 38
Japan 0 0 0 20 2 3 5 4 2 0 36
South Africa 0 15 0 7 1 3 1 1 6 0 34
South Korea 0 0 0 21 1 0 0 7 4 0 33
Israel 1 0 0 16 2 0 0 0 12 0 31
China 0 2 0 15 0 1 1 3 8 0 30
Denmark 0 0 1 8 3 0 0 6 7 0 25
Hong Kong 0 1 0 9 1 1 0 6 4 0 22
Ireland-Rep 0 2 0 7 4 1 0 6 2 0 22
Bermuda 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 7 0 0 20
Taiwan 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 5 3 0 20
Singapore 0 2 1 8 2 1 0 3 2 0 19
Indonesia 1 6 0 8 0 1 0 2 0 0 18
Turkey 0 0 0 9 1 0 2 5 0 0 17
Mexico 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 11 0 0 16
Chile 0 1 0 3 5 0 2 4 0 0 15
Luxembourg 0 2 0 1 3 0 0 7 2 0 15
Czech Republic 0 0 2 2 4 0 0 4 1 0 13
Greece 0 0 0 6 4 0 0 2 1 0 13
Colombia 0 0 0 4 1 0 2 3 1 0 11
New Zealand 1 0 0 5 1 1 0 0 3 0 11
Peru 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 3 0 0 11




Table B: Number of targets per industry, per country 
Argentina 0 1 0 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 10
Hungary 0 2 0 3 1 0 1 0 3 0 10
Estonia 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 9
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 2 0 9
Egypt 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Lithuania 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 2 0 0 8
Jersey 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 7
Morocco 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 7
Thailand 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 7
Guernsey 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 6
Croatia 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 5
Cyprus 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5
Ukraine 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 5
Jordan 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 4
Slovenia 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 4
Ecuador 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Latvia 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3
Serbia 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3
Vietnam 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 3
Bosnia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
British Virgin 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Iceland 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Nigeria 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Serbia & Mont. 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Slovak Rep 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Utd Arab Em 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2
Antigua 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Cameroon 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Falkland Is 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Faroe Islands 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Isle of Man 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Jamaica 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Neth Antilles 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Reunion 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sri Lanka 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1



































conglomerate M&A 8 70 41 497 237 54 74 614 313 7818
% of total 50% 14% 38% 21% 33% 65% 34% 24% 25% 100%
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 8 429 68 1828 474 29 142 1989 943 0
% of total 50% 86% 62% 79% 67% 35% 66% 76% 75% 0%

















Conglomerate M&A 0 11 8 59 47 9 14 42 52 242
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 0 21 19 263 86 1 25 236 121 772
% of total  - 66% 70% 82% 65% 10% 64% 85% 70% 76%
Total deals 0 32 27 322 133 10 39 278 173 1014
2001 0
Conglomerate M&A 2 6 2 59 30 7 6 43 27 182
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 0 31 8 167 43 5 17 175 110 556
% of total 0% 84% 80% 74% 59% 42% 74% 80% 80% 75%
Total deals 2 37 10 226 73 12 23 218 137 738
2002 0
Conglomerate M&A 0 2 3 24 17 4 2 37 10 99
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 1 18 10 112 35 1 15 132 73 397
% of total 100% 90% 77% 82% 67% 20% 88% 78% 88% 80%
Total deals 1 20 13 136 52 5 17 169 83 496
2003 0
Conglomerate M&A 0 5 1 25 13 4 4 37 19 108
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 0 17 3 101 22 2 9 112 68 334
% of total  - 77% 75% 80% 63% 33% 69% 75% 78% 76%














Total deals 0 22 4 126 35 6 13 149 87 442
2004 0
Conglomerate M&A 0 3 0 27 11 1 4 25 17 88
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 0 22 4 95 21 3 7 141 62 355
% of total  - 88% 100% 78% 66% 75% 64% 85% 78% 80%
Total deals 0 25 4 122 32 4 11 166 79 443
2005 0
Conglomerate M&A 1 1 0 36 16 5 4 35 21 119
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 2 28 0 125 29 2 6 118 73 383
% of total 67% 97%  - 78% 64% 29% 60% 77% 78% 76%
Total deals 3 29 0 161 45 7 10 153 94 502
2006 0
Conglomerate M&A 1 5 5 39 12 3 1 38 26 130
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 1 33 7 110 34 1 6 129 57 378
% of total 50% 87% 58% 74% 74% 25% 86% 77% 69% 74%
Total deals 2 38 12 149 46 4 7 167 83 508
2007 0
Conglomerate M&A 0 8 2 35 17 4 10 66 20 162
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 1 46 3 138 27 3 11 144 72 445
% of total 100% 85% 60% 80% 61% 43% 52% 69% 78% 73%
Total deals 1 54 5 173 44 7 21 210 92 607
2008 0
Conglomerate M&A 0 9 2 35 10 2 9 70 18 155
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 0 31 1 101 23 0 5 116 55 332
% of total  - 78% 33% 74% 70% 0% 36% 62% 75% 68%
Total deals 0 40 3 136 33 2 14 186 73 487
2009 0
Conglomerate M&A 0 3 5 22 10 0 2 47 19 108
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 1 37 3 75 28 0 3 77 32 256
% of total 100% 93% 38% 77% 74%  - 60% 62% 63% 70%
Total deals 1 40 8 97 38 0 5 124 51 364
2010 0
Conglomerate M&A 1 7 4 26 6 1 6 36 12 99
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 1 29 0 83 16 3 5 62 40 239
% of total 50% 81% 0% 76% 73% 75% 45% 63% 77% 71%
Total deals 2 36 4 109 22 4 11 98 52 338
2011 0
Conglomerate M&A 1 2 0 24 10 1 5 31 6 80
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 0 31 4 63 17 2 5 60 29 211
% of total 0% 94% 100% 72% 63% 67% 50% 66% 83% 73%
Total deals 1 33 4 87 27 3 10 91 35 291
2012 0
Conglomerate M&A 0 2 1 20 8 6 1 17 18 73
Non-Conglomerate M&A(same industry) 0 18 0 65 15 2 6 52 17 175
% of total  - 90% 0% 76% 65% 25% 86% 75% 49% 71%

















Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 234 Sample size 234 Sample size 234
sample mean 9,77% sample mean 4,78% sample mean 7,00%
ste error 5,80% ste error 2,64% ste error 2,96%
t stat 1,68586 t stat 1,80979 t stat 2,36273
Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 234 Sample size 234 Sample size 234
sample mean 23,96% sample mean 6,32% sample mean 14,16%
ste error 16,37% ste error 2,41% ste error 7,40%
t stat 1,46370 t stat 2,62600 t stat 1,91362
2006 e 2009 2007 e 2008 Total
2006 e 2009 2007 e 2008 Total
Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 16 days- 15 days before the announcement Event Window: 16 days- 15 days before the announcement Event Window: 16 days- 15 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017














Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 234 Sample size 234 Sample size 234
sample mean 18,64% sample mean 10,43% sample mean 14,08%
ste error 13,21% ste error 2,14% ste error 5,98%
t stat 1,41082 t stat 4,88545 t stat 2,35443
Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 234 Sample size 234 Sample size 234
sample mean 28,52% sample mean 8,83% sample mean 17,59%
ste error 19,99% ste error 2,88% ste error 9,02%
t stat 1,42713 t stat 3,06872 t stat 1,94853
2006 e 2009 2007 e 2008 Total
2006 e 2009 2007 e 2008 Total
Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 11 days- 10 days before  the announcement Event Window: 21 days- 11 days before the announcement Event Window: 11 days- 10 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017













Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 234 Sample size 234 Sample size 234
sample mean 26,46% sample mean 12,26% sample mean 18,57%
ste error 17,46% ste error 2,21% ste error 7,85%
t stat 1,51505 t stat 5,55169 t stat 2,36546
Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 234 Sample size 234 Sample size 234
sample mean 31,73% sample mean 9,73% sample mean 19,51%
ste error 21,86% ste error 2,68% ste error 9,83%
t stat 1,45149 t stat 3,63812 t stat 1,98501
2006 e 2009 2007 e 2008 Total
2006 e 2009 2007 e 2008 Total
Event Window: 15 days- 7 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 15 days- 7 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 15 days- 7 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 8 days- 7 days before the announcement Event Window: 8 days- 7 days before the announcement Event Window: 8 days- 7 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017













Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 234 Sample size 234 Sample size 234
sample mean 28,50% sample mean 9,54% sample mean 17,97%
ste error 19,71% ste error 2,31% ste error 8,85%
t stat 1,44573 t stat 4,12299 t stat 2,02959
Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 234 Sample size 234 Sample size 234
sample mean 33,29% sample mean 6,51% sample mean 18,41%
ste error 23,03% ste error 1,80% ste error 10,29%
t stat 1,44556 t stat 3,61573 t stat 1,78874
2006 e 2009 2007 e 2008 Total
2006 e 2009 2007 e 2008 Total
Event Window: 11 days- 5 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 11 days- 5 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 11 days- 5 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 6 days- 5 days before the announcement Event Window: 6 days- 5 days before the announcement Event Window: 6 days- 5 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017














Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 236 Sample size 236 Sample size 236
sample mean 0,15% sample mean 0,76% sample mean 0,48%
ste error 0,76% ste error 0,75% ste error 0,54%
t stat 0,20095 t stat 1,00737 t stat 0,90352
Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 236 Sample size 236 Sample size 236
sample mean -0,97% sample mean -1,28% sample mean -1,14%
ste error 1,30% ste error 0,63% ste error 0,68%
t stat -0,75085 t stat -2,03459 t stat -1,67958
2006	e	2009 2007	e	2008 Total
2006	e	2009 2007	e	2008 Total
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement
Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017













Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 236 Sample size 236 Sample size 236
sample mean 0,31% sample mean 1,12% sample mean 0,75%
ste error 0,92% ste error 1,12% ste error 0,74%
t stat 0,33820 t stat 0,99749 t stat 1,01638
Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 236 Sample size 236 Sample size 236
sample mean 0,41% sample mean -1,12% sample mean -0,43%
ste error 0,80% ste error 0,64% ste error 0,50%
t stat 0,51901 t stat -1,75222 t stat -0,84297
Total2007	e	20082006	e	2009
2006	e	2009 2007	e	2008 Total
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 11 days- 10 days before  the announcement Event Window: 21 days- 11 days before the announcement Event Window: 11 days- 10 days before the announcement
Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before and after the announcement













Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 236 Sample size 236 Sample size 236
sample mean 1,38% sample mean 1,92% sample mean 1,67%
ste error 0,69% ste error 1,47% ste error 0,86%
t stat 1,99546 t stat 1,30182 t stat 1,93864
Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 236 Sample size 236 Sample size 236
sample mean 0,43% sample mean -0,57% sample mean -0,12%
ste error 0,67% ste error 0,59% ste error 0,44%
t stat 0,64161 t stat -0,96711 t stat -0,26137
Total2007	e	20082006	e	2009
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 8 days- 7 days before the announcement Event Window: 8 days- 7 days before the announcement Event Window: 8 days- 7 days before the announcement
2006	e	2009 2007	e	2008 Total
Event Window: 15 days- 7 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 15 days- 7 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 15 days- 7 days before and after the announcement













Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 236 Sample size 236 Sample size 236
sample mean -0,02% sample mean 0,43% sample mean 0,23%
ste error 0,86% ste error 0,80% ste error 0,59%
t stat -0,02460 t stat 0,53816 t stat 0,38637
Summary measures Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 236 Sample size 236 Sample size 236
sample mean -0,76% sample mean -2,11% sample mean -1,50%
ste error 0,68% ste error 1,27% ste error 0,76%
t stat -1,12330 t stat -1,66292 t stat -1,97573
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 11 days- 5 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 11 days- 5 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 11 days- 5 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Event Window: 6 days- 5 days before the announcement Event Window: 6 days- 5 days before the announcement Event Window: 6 days- 5 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)






Annex 18: Results of the CARs analysis for the different time scopes- Targets 2016-2017 
 
 














Table B: -10/10 and -10/0 days results 
 
Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 44 Sample size 44
sample mean 4,93% sample mean 8,21%
ste error 1,31% ste error 2,43%
t stat 3,751797113 t stat 3,38065006
Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Event Window: 16 days- 15 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 44 Sample size 44
sample mean 9,61% sample mean 11,18%
ste error 2,41% ste error 3,12%
t stat 3,99421234 t stat 3,587226253
Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 11 days- 10 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017





















Table D: -5/5 and -5/0 days results 
 
Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 44 Sample size 44
sample mean 10,65% sample mean 11,63%
ste error 1,60% ste error 1,67%
t stat 6,671359484 t stat 6,960868762
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 15 days- 7 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 8 days- 7 days before the announcement
Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 44 Sample size 44
sample mean 11,28% sample mean 12,67%
ste error 2,57% ste error 3,00%
t stat 4,390462286 t stat 4,224282165
Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 11 days- 5 days before and after the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Event Window: 6 days- 5 days before the announcement


































Table B: -10/10 and -10/0 days results 
 
Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 44 Sample size 44
sample mean 0,79% sample mean 0,14%
ste error 0,79% ste error 0,71%
t stat 0,998337174 t stat 0,191260565
Event Window: 31 days- 15 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 16 days- 15 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 44 Sample size 44
sample mean -0,49% sample mean -0,55%
ste error 1,08% ste error 0,71%
t stat -0,450480329 t stat -0,777376085
Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 21 days- 10 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
































Table D: -5/5 and -5/0 days results 
 
 
Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 44 Sample size 44
sample mean -0,03% sample mean 0,11%
ste error 0,73% ste error 0,71%
t stat -0,045620845 t stat 0,158516567
Event Window: 15 days- 7 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 8 days- 7 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017
Test: mean=0 (two tails) Test: mean=0 (two tails)
Summary measures Summary measures
Sample size 44 Sample size 44
sample mean -0,40% sample mean -0,53%
ste error 0,75% ste error 0,65%
t stat -0,535888597 t stat -0,812306055
Event Window: 11 days- 5 days before and after the announcement Event Window: 6 days- 5 days before the announcement
Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017 Result for Sample analysis: Target firms 2016-2017






































        var1        F(233, 7020) =      4.398   0.000         (234 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     .0421447   .0074283     5.67   0.000      .027583    .0567064
                                                                              
        var2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     0.6327
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.0984
                                                  R-squared       =     0.1274
                                                  Prob > F        =          .
                                                  F(   0,   7020) =          .




































        var1        F(130, 3930) =     12.750   0.000         (131 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     .0348297    .002795    12.46   0.000     .0293499    .0403095
                                                                              
        var2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     0.1781
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.2734
                                                  R-squared       =     0.2966
                                                  Prob > F        =          .
                                                  F(   0,   3930) =          .

















        var1        F(102, 3090) =      4.028   0.000         (103 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     .0514482   .0164973     3.12   0.002     .0191015    .0837949
                                                                              
        var2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     0.9322
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.0882
                                                  R-squared       =     0.1174
                                                  Prob > F        =          .
                                                  F(   0,   3090) =          .




































        var1        F(235, 7080) =     44.056   0.000         (236 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0000685   .0009272    -0.07   0.941    -.0018862    .0017492
                                                                              
        var2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     0.0793
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.5804
                                                  R-squared       =     0.5939
                                                  Prob > F        =          .
                                                  F(   0,   7080) =          .




































        var1        F(128, 3870) =     26.645   0.000         (129 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons     .0038869   .0014655     2.65   0.008     .0010138    .0067601
                                                                              
        var2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     0.0927
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.4509
                                                  R-squared       =     0.4685
                                                  Prob > F        =          .
                                                  F(   0,   3870) =          .






























 Table A  
 
 
        var1        F(106, 3210) =     95.670   0.000         (107 categories)
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0048372   .0010301    -4.70   0.000    -.0068569   -.0028174
                                                                              
        var2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                  Root MSE        =     0.0593
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.7516
                                                  R-squared       =     0.7596
                                                  Prob > F        =          .
                                                  F(   0,   3210) =          .
Linear regression, absorbing indicators           Number of obs   =       3317
